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WRITING REQUIREMENTS AND THE PAROL
EVIDENCE RULE
A Student Symposium
WRITINGS AND ORAL PROOF IN CIVILIAN JURISDICTIONS:
A THEORETICAL AND HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
Introduction
The organization and values of the state and society strongly
influence the procedural framework governing the law of proof of a
particular jurisdiction and are especially important in determining
the weight of oral or parol evidence offered against a written instru-
ment. The Louisiana law of parol evidence has been greatly influ-
enced by a Roman and French tradition and reflects centuries of
development in legal thought and in the organization of commerce
and society. It is now firmly established in civilian jurisdictions that
parol evidence by witnesses is admissible only as an exception to the
general maxim of proof that writings are better than witnesses.' Anal-
ysis of the specific rules of law governing the use of parol evidence in
Louisiana must necessarily begin with an exploration of the historical
and theoretical basis of this civilian maxim.'
Historic Development: Writings v. Testimony
Roman Law
Civil proceedings in classical Rome 3 were divided into two
stages.' In the first stage, the parties presented their claims and de-
fenses to the praetor, a public official who had the power to grant
1. L. WENGER, INSTITUTES OF THE ROMAN LAW OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 293 (1940)
[hereinafter cited as WENGER].
2. For a detailed analysis of the provisions of the Louisiana Civil Code see Com-
ment, 35 LA. L. REv. 764 (1975) (arts. 2236, 2275, 2278); Comment, 35 LA. L. REV. 779
(1975) (art. 2276).
3. For the purpose of this discussion, classical civil proceedings should be thought
of as spanning from the middle of the Republic (510-27 B.C.) until the end of the
Principate (27 B.C.-284 A.D.).
4. See generally W. BUCKLAND, A MANUAL OF ROMAN PmVATE LAW 361 (2d ed. 1939)
[hereinafter cited as BUCKLAND]; M. RADIN, HANDBOOK OF ROMAN LAW 30 (1927)
[hereinafter cited as RADIN]; WENGER at 190.
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provisional relief.5 The praetor's main function, however, was to issue
a formula, a written command similar to a modern jury charge, which
set forth the applicable law and the issues as agreed on by the parties
and the praetor1 The praetor then sent the prepared formula to the
iudex,7 a private citizen selected from an official list8 with the consent
of the parties. In the second stage of the proceedings, the parties
sought to establish their respective allegations before the iudex, who
heard the testimony of the parties, weighed the evidence and ren-
dered a decision in accordance with the formula.' No appeal was
provided for, but some extraordinary remedies were available against
judgments rendered by corrupt judges.1°
No law of evidence, as we understand it, was practiced by the
iudex; nor as a practical matter was there any means of effectively
enforcing rules of evidence since the lay iudex was not necessarily
schooled in the rule of law and his judgment was not appealable."
Thus, classical Roman procedure utilized the theory of "free weighing
of proof,"' 2 allowing the iudex to weigh the evidence according to
his own free will'3 and admitting every means of proof which contrib-
uted to persuade the iudex of the validity of a particular allegation.
Since in ancient times, parties transacted business verbally, 4 relying
on the presence and memory of witnesses to prove the existence and
contents of an agreement, the iudex preferred the testimony of wit-
nesses to written evidence or documents which most often were un-
available. '1
As Rome's commerce expanded, the simple formalistic verbal
5. A. ENGELMANN, A HISTORY OF CONTINENTAL CIVIL PROCEDURE 311-15 (1927)
[hereinafter cited as ENGELMANNI; P. HERZOG, CIVIL PROCEDURE IN FRANCE 39 (1967)
[hereinafter cited as HERZOG].
6. ENGELMANN at 252.
7. W. BUCKLAND & A. McNAIR, ROMAN LAW AND COMMON LAW 318 (1936) [here-
inafter cited as BUCKLAND & McNAMR].
8. HERZOG at 39-40.
9. BUCKLAND at 419-20; RADIN at 46; WENGER at 140-58.
10. HERZOG at 40.
11. BUCKLAND & McNAIR at 318.
12. Id. at 201.
13. DIGEST 22.5.3.2: "[Y]ou must decide from the opinion in your mind what you
believe or what you view sufficiently probable." (All translations supplied by the
author.)
14. One party would ask "do you promise?" (spondesne?), which was called the
stipulation; the other would answer "I promise" (spondeo), which was called the prom-
ise. The entire transaction became known by the former name, stipulatio. See DIGEST
45.1.1.6; CODE 8.37.10.
15. H. JOLOWICZ, HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF ROMAN LAW 188 (2d
ed. 1952) [hereinafter cited as JoLowicz].
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rituals, dasily understood and witnessed by bystanders, became
unsatisfactory as a method of transacting business, and parties in-
creasingly reduced to writing the terms and nature of their transac-
tions.' Consequently, the iudex began to accord more weight to docu-
mentary evidence in his process of free weighing of proof, 7 although
as late as 317 A.D. documents and testimony of witnesses were given
equal weight."
When the center of the Empire shifted to the more civilized East
in the fourth century A.D., Roman law became influenced by Hellen-
istic and Byzantine ideas." As a result of the change in the organiza-
tion of the Roman state from a Western Principate to an Oriental
Monarchy, legislation became more absolutist and patriarchal, a de-
velopment which in turn left its imprint on the legal system and the
law of proof.2" Courts were established on a hierarchial basis, and
appeals could be taken to higher courts, and ultimately to the Em-
peror. " The function of fact finding, formerly performed by private
citizens, was entrusted to a iudex who was a public official, usually
a lawyer.22 Most significantly, the practice of free weighing of proof
was gradually eroded by a bounded theory of proof which compelled
the iudex to disregard his subjective convictions and follow statuto-
rily defined rules of evidence. 3
The evidentiary weight accorded oral evidence and documents
also underwent a marked change. In 334 A.D., Constantine an-
nounced that the evidence of only one witness was not to be consid-
ered.24 The growing distrust of oral evidence was further manifest in
the Justinian legislation by the many rules governing the minimum
number of witnesses, their capacity to testify, and the weight to be
given their testimony.2 The equality of oral and documentary evi-
16. J. BROWN, THE ORIGIN AND EARLY HISTORY OF THE OFFICE OF NOTARY 3-4 (1934).
17. WENGER at 294.
18. CODE 4.21.15: "In the administration of justice, documentary evidence has the
same force as the depositions of witnesses."
19. BUCKLAND & McNAMR 19. The reign of Diocletion, who named himself emperor
in 284 A.D., marks the end of the Roman Principate. His successor, Constantine,
established the center of power in Constantinople in 325 A.D.
20. WENGER at 293.
21. BUCKLAND & McNAIR at 319; HERZOG at 40.
22. Id.
23. JoLowICz at 462; WENGER at 201.
24. CODE 4.20.9: "[Ulnius omnino testis reponsio non audiatur ......
25. Where the number of witnesses was not specified by law, two were sufficient.
Many persons were absolutely disqualified from giving testimony: slaves who were not
tortured, adulterers, Jews, heretics and infamous persons. The credibility of a particu-
lar witness varied according to his status in society and his wealth. See CODE 1.5.21;
4.20.9; 4.20.17; 7.6.1; 8.18.11; DIGEST 22.5.3-.6; 22.5.12; INSTITUTES 2.10.3; Nov. 90.1.1.
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dence which had emerged in the last years of the Principate, quickly
shifted to a preference for documents when the center of the Empire
shifted." The simple and forceful opening fragment in the Justinian
legislation, De Testibus, 11 embodied this charge: "No nonwritten tes-
timony shall be offered against written testimony."2
French Law: Middle Ages to Nineteenth Century
The collapse of the Roman Empire in the West brought an ex-
pansion of the adjudicatory powers of the ecclesiastical courts in
France. Canon law procedure, used in the ecclesiastical courts, bor-
rowed heavily from the Roman law and, in contrast to the Germanic-
barbarian procedure of the feudal courts of France, it was predomi-
nantly a written procedure. Canon law used Roman means of proof,
such as documents and witnesses, rather than the Germanic ordeal
or judicial combat. As in Roman law, Canon law procedure em-
ployed a complex system of mechanical rules precisely determining
the number and quality of witnesses necessary to prove an event or
to overcome other evidence."
During the Medieval Period, however, written proof became dis-
trusted primarily because of the abundance of forgeries and the not
infrequent issuance of false documents purporting to be papal de-
crees.' In 1029, a decretal of Pope Innocent III declared that the
probative value of the depositions of four witnesses outweighed that
of a notarized document.2 From the commingling of Roman and
Canonical law came a retreat from the rule that documentary proof
was superior to oral evidence and a return to the idea that a written
document was merely another form of testimony.3 Thus, the rule
received in the French customary law in the next century took its
form in the maxim: "Witnesses are better than writings" (t~moins
passent lettres) A'
As a result of a weak monarchy, secular justice in France during
the early Middle Ages was administered by the feudal lords who had
26. CODE 4.21.15. See text at note 19, supra.
27. CODE 4.20, Concerning Witnesses.
28. CODE 4.20.1: "Contra scriptur testimonium non scriptur testimonium haud
profertur."
29. HERZOG at 41.
30. R. SCHLESINGER, COMPARATIVE LAW 309 (3d ed. 1970).
31. Levy, The Evolution of Written Proof, 13 AM. U.L. REv. 133, 148-49 (1964)
[hereinafter cited as LEVY].
32. Id. at 146.
33. See A. LOYSEL, INsTturEs COUTUMIERES, Liv. V, Tit. V, Loi V, n.' 774 (1608)
[hereinafter cited as LOYSEL].
34. LEvy at 147.
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acquired power to hold court." The feudal courts used the less-
developed, non-written Germanic procedure rather than the written
procedure of the ecclesiastical courts. However, St. Louis, dissatisfied
with the Germanic methods of prooftaking, abolished judicial combat
in the royal court of Paris in 1260 and replaced it with an inquest
procedure." Likewise, in the feudal courts in the rest of France, Ger-
manic procedure was gradually supplanted by Roman-canonical pro-
cedure; written pleadings replaced oral presentations and, as in the
Roman and Canon law traditions, documents became an important
means of proof.37 However, because of Canon law's influence on
Roman law, the preference for witnesses over writings prevailed in
French procedure.38
In addition to the evolution of civil procedure, another factor
contributing to the use of documents in proceedings was the shift
away from formalism in contract formation. Loysel's famous maxim,
"as bulls are bound by their horns, so men are by their words,"
describes the essence of formalistic law.39 The will had no existence
except to the extent to which it was expressed by exact words or acts.
Matters such as good or bad faith, mistake, duress and fraud had no
effect upon the formation of a contract or its interpretation because
the strict tenor of the act, not intent, was all important. 0 The use of
symbols and solemnities compelled the parties to adhere strictly to
prescribed words and acts, such as a blow with the palm of the hand.
The problems inherent in such a system of contract formation, espe-
cially the desire to give effect to the intent of the parties, caused the
Franks to abandon formalism and to adopt the Roman practice of
written documentation in transactions."
While there was new ease in contract formation effected by re-
placing solemnities and symbols with a simple agreement between
the parties, the increasing importance accorded the intention or will
of the parties required that the law of proof, affecting the interpreta-
tion of contracts, become stricter. Correlatively, greater emphasis
was placed upon drawing up documents to evidence intention and to
avoid perjured testimony.'"
35. HERZOG at 42.
36. ENGELMANN at 651.
37. HERZOG at 43.
38. Id.
39. LOYSEL n' 357. Actually, Loysel attributed the verse to the glossators and
ancient commentators of Roman law: "Verba ligant homines, taurorum comua funes.
Cornu bos capitur, voce ligatur homo."
40. J. BRISSAUD, A HISTORY OF FRENCH PRIVATE LAw 486 (1912).
41. Id. at 487.
42. Id. at 505.
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The function of a document reciting a contract in Roman law was
evidentiary, that is, it was a method of proof.43 The binding nature
of the contract arose from a party's oral promise and not from the
writing, which simply recited the promise." However, as formalism
gave way to writing, the Franks did not distinguish clearly between
the question of proof and that of the existence of a contract, and they
equated the writing which recited the contract with the solemnities
of formalism. An imperfect understanding of the Roman law con-
vinced the Franks that for many contracts to be binding, they must
be reduced to writing. Thus, some writings reciting contracts took on
a cautionary dimension in the French customary law.
At the end of the Middle Ages, further growth in the use of
documents was fostered by royal legislation of the French monarchy."
Although royal legislation had been an unimportant source of proce-
dural law during the Middle Ages,4" its contribution to that area of
the law gained significance during the fourteenth and fifteenth centu-
ries. The massive reform of the notary corps effected by royal legisla-
tion left an indelible imprint on contract formation by making notar-
ized documents guarantees of authenticity. With the growth of the
merchant class came a diffusion of education in the trading cities,
helping to erode the medieval suspicion of writings. As contracts
became more complex, merchants were less willing to rely on their
memories and sought the assistance of the notary corps. 7 Finally, in
1566, custom became consecrated into law by the royal Ordonnance
de Moulins,"5 which enshrined the superiority of written proof over
oral testimony."
43. But see W. BUCKLAND, A TEXT-BOOK OF ROMAN LAW 461 (2d ed. 1950) for an
enumeration of authorities who contended that the writing had become a substantive
element of the contract.
44. In the construction of contracts in the Roman law, intent was considered
rather than what was stated in the writing. See CODE 4.22.1: "In contractibus rei
veritas potius, quam scriptura perspici debet."
45. LEVY at 149.
46. HERZOG at 45.
47. LEVY at 149-50.
48. Contained in M. BoicE~u ET M. DANTY, TRAIT9 DE LA PREUVE PAR TAMOINS EN
MATIitRE CIVILE 26 (7e 6d. 1789) [hereinafter cited as BOICEAU ET DANTY].
49. The classical raison d'etre for this legislation was the fear of perjury and
subornation. See BoICEAU ET DANTY at 25. It should not be assumed, however, that the
Ordonnance de Moulins was an impulsive enactment resulting from a sixteenth cen-
tury epidemic of mendacity. In 1245, article 157 of the Statuts d'Arles had prohibited
oral evidence where the value of the object of the agreement exceeded one hundred
sous. See P. VIOLLET, 3 LES ESTABUSSEMENTS DE SAINT Louis 143 (1881). Similar stat-
utes had been enacted in Bordeaux in the sixteenth century and in Champagne in the
fourteenth century. See P. VIOLLET, 1 LEs 9STABLISSEMENTS DE SAINT Louis 324 (1881).
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Article 54 of the Ordonnance de Moulins included two measures:
(1) contracts involving more than one hundred livres must be drawn
up before notaries; (2) no testimony by witnesses shall be received
beyond what is contained in such contracts." These provisions, in
amplified form, were inserted in the Ordonnance civile touchant la
reformation de la justice of Louis XIV, which codified civil procedure
throughout France,5 and are presently included in article 1341 of the
French Civil Code.5" Thus, since the enactment of the Ordonnance,
a wide field has existed in which documents alone are entitled to
recognition as a means of proof. 3
50. "[Die toutes choses exc~dant la somme ou valeur de cent livres pour une fois
payer, seront passes contrats pardevant notaires et t~moins, par lesquels contrats
seulment sera fait et reque toute preuve desdites mati~res, sans recevoir aucune preuve
par tOmoins, outre le contenu audit contrat, ni sur ce qui seroit all6gu6 avoir t dit
ou convenu avant icelui lors et depuis. . . ." Found in BoicEAu ET DANTY at 26.
51. Title XX, art. 2: "Seront passes actes pardevant notaires ou sous signature
priv~e, de toute choses, 6xcedant la somme ou valeur de cent livres, m~me pour d~p6t
volontaire; et ne sera reque aucune preuve par t~moins contre et outre le contenu aux
actes, ni sur ce qui seroit all~gu6 avoir 6 dit avant, lors, ou depuis les actes, encore
qu'il s'aglt d'une somme ou valeur moindre de cent livres, sans tontesfois rien innover
pour ce regard, en ce qui s'observe en la justice des juges et consuls des marchands."
See BOICEAU r DAT at 26.
Note that article 54 of the Ordonnance de Moulins applied only to agreements,
because it provided that "contracts shall be passed" (seront pass~s contrats). Title XX
extended the scope of the provision to include not only agreements, but "generally all
things of which the party demands permission to make proof, and of which he could
have procured proof in writing" by providing that "acts shall be passed of all things"
(seront passes actes. . . de toutes choses). 2 OEuvREs DE POTHIER n° 785 (2e 6d. 1861)
[hereinafter cited as OEuvREs]. Another difference of some significance is that article
54 of the Ordonnance de Moulins only prohibited the testimony of things beyond the
writing (outre le contenu); Title XX also proscribed proof against the writing (contre
et outre le contenu). 2 PLANIOL, CIVIL LAW TREATISE pt. 1 no. 1138 at 646 (11th ed. La.
St. L. Inst. transl. 1959) [hereinafter cited as PLANIOL].
52. FRENCH CIv. CODE art. 1341: "I1 doit 6tre pass6 acte devant notaires ou sous
signatures privies de toutes choses 6xcedant la somme ou Ia valeur de 50 F, meme pour
d~p6ts volontaires, et il n'est requ aucune preuve par t~moins contre et outre le contenu
aux actes, ni sur se qui serait all~gu6 avoie t dit avant, lors ou depous les actes,
encore qu'il s'agisse d'une somme ou valeur moindre de 50 F. Le tout sans prejudice
de ce qui est prescrit dans les lois relatives au commerce."
"There must be documents executed before notaries or under private signature,
for all things exceeding the sum or value of 50 francs, even for voluntary bailments,
and no proof shall be received by testimony contradicting and beyond the contents of
the document, nor concerning that which is alleged to have been said before, at the
time or since the documents, although the sum or value was less than 50 francs. All of
this is without prejudice to that which is prescribed in the laws relating to commerce."
53. ENGELMANN at 720.
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Modern French Civil Code: Article 1341 and its Exceptions
A rule providing that a juridical act or contract be in writing may
be either an evidentiary or a substantive requirement. When a writ-
ing serves an evidentiary function (ad probationem), its omission
does not render the act void, but merely hazardous or impossible to
prove. When the requirement of a writing is substantive, it serves a
cautionary function (ad solemnitatem), and its omission precludes
the existence of a valid legal act.' The writing requirement of article
1341 of the French Civil Code is of an evidentiary character; it is a
prerequisite intended to prohibit admission of parol evidence to prove
an obligation, not one upon which the existence and validity of an
obligation depends.55
Article 1341 which forms the basis of the entire French theory of
evidence relating to civil matters"6 includes three measures: (1) juridi-
cal acts involving more than fifty francs must be evidenced by docu-
ments executed before a notary or under private signature;57 (2) no
testimony by witnesses may be received against (contre) or beyond
(outre) notarial or private acts, even if the value of the object of the
juridical act is less than fifty francs;" and (3) no testimony by wit-
nesses may be received as to subsequent verbal transactions that
modify or add to any written agreement." The practical result of
these provisions is that parties must "establish in advance" the proof
of legal acts in writing, i.e. pre-constituted proof. However, the Code
and French courts have established a certain number of well-defined
exceptions.
The first exception to article 1341 is that where there exists a
"beginning of proof in writing" (commencement de preuve par
6crit), 0 parol evidence is admissible to supplement the writing. Arti-
cle 1347 defines "beginning of proof in writing" as "a written docu-
ment emanating from the person against whom the claim is made,
54. 1 S. LrrvINOFF, OBLIGATIONS § 341 in 6 LOUISIANA CIVIL LAW TREATISE 593 (1969)
[hereinafter cited as LrrviNorFI. There is a fine line of distinction between the prere-
quisites for the validity of an obligation and those which merely relate to the method
of proving it.
55. 4 AUBRY & RAU, Daorr CIVIL FRAN AIS § 306 (6th ed. Bartin 1942) in A.
YIANNOPOULOS, 1 CIVIL LAW TRANSLATIONS 93 (1965) [hereinafter cited as 4 AUBRY &
RAUJ.
56. R. DAVID AND H. DEVRiEs, THE FRENCH LEGAL SYSTEM 73-78 (1958).
57. See 1 PLANIOL no. 354.
58. See J. DOMAT, THE CIVIL LAW IN ITS NATURAL ORDER no. 2022 at 802 (Strahan
transl. 1853) [hereinafter cited as DOMAT]; 2 PLANIOL no. 1138.
59. 2 PLANIOL no. 1139.
60. 2 PLANIOL nos' 1117, 1124-25; J. SicARD, LA PREUVE EN JUSTICE nos. 334-50 at
236-44 (6e 6d. 1960) [hereinafter cited as SICARD].
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or from the person whom he represents, which makes the fact alleged
probable."6" French doctrine has declared that such things as books
of commerce, a contract invalid for failure to meet formal require-
ments, letters from the party to be charged, even if unsigned,6" and
writings prepared after commencement of litigation, such as answers
to interrogations, all may form the beginning of written proof. 3
Whether the writing actually renders probable the fact alleged is a
question of fact left for resolution by the lower courts.
Under the second major exception to article 1341 parol is admis-
sible when it has been impossible to procure written proof of the act
to be established," for instance, when obligations arise out of quasi-
contract, delicts or quasi-delicts 1 It is not enough to show that the
obligation arose from a quasi-contract, such as negotiorum gestio, to
avoid the application of article 1341; it must also be shown that
procurement of written evidence was not possible. 6
The exception of the impossibility of procurement of written
proof also extends to transactions, written proof of which has been
lost as a result of force majeure67 and to those alleged to be tainted
by fraud, duress, mistake or misrepresentation." In cases involving
fraud, even an authentic act is subject to the exception,69 but, as in
all instances under the exception, the plaintiff must establish the
impossibility of procurement of written proof. In general, the deci-
sions of French courts have been liberal in construing the meaning
of the impossibility of procurement of written proof, perhaps in order
to liberate themselves from the principle of formality of proof and
thus broaden the possibilities of investigation of fact."
61. FRENCH Civ. CODE art. 1347. A beginning of written proof has also been defined
as incomplete written proof. HERZOG at 323.
62. HERZOG at 323. The requirement that the beginning of a written proof ema-
nate from the person against whom a claim is made has been construed liberally. A
post card written by a wife who was acting on behalf of her husband has been held to
come from the latter. Civ. 1 re, July 7, 1955 [1955] D.S. Jur. 1. 737.
63. 12 AUBRY ET RAU, COURS DE DROIT CIVIL FRANqAIS no. 764 at 346 (5e 6d. 1922)
[hereinafter cited as 12 AUBRY ET RAU].
64. FRENCH CIv. CODE art. 1348. See also SICARD no. 351.
65. FRENCH CIV. CODE art. 1348(1).
66. 0. BODINGTON, AN OUTLINE OF THE FRENCH LAW OF EVIDENCE 52 (1904)
[hereinafter cited as BODINOTON]. That the drafters of the Code explicitly included
torts within the exception indicates how far reaching the policy underlying article 1341
was intended to apply, since the article, on its face, is applicable only to juridical acts.
67. FRENCH Civ. CODE art. 1348(4). See also 2 PLANIOL nos. 1122-23. Force majeure
is equivalent to an "act of God."
68. FRENCH CIV. CODE art. 1353; See SICARD no. 332.
69. Civ. 1re, July 13, 1874, [18741 S. Jur. I. 1. 469.
70. Giverdon, The Problem of Proof in French Civil Law, 31 TUL. L. REV. 31, 33
19751
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Although parol evidence can not be admitted between the parties
to establish a simulation since the parties could have proved their
agreement by drawing up a counter-letter at the time of the transac-
tion, another exception to article 1341 permits third parties to prove
simulations by testimony. However, if the simulation is contained in
an authentic act, those recitals made by a notary within his personal
knowledge can only be attacked by the cumbersome proceeding
called inscription de faux.7
The last major exception to the general rule of article 1341 ad-
mits parol evidence in the instance of commercial transactions" to
encourage the free flow of commerce with its concomitant elements
of speed and multiplicity of transactions. The exception in the case
of commercial law is curious since the superiority of writing as proof
is attributable in no small way to the custom of merchants. However,
because merchants in fact seldom transact business orally and are
required by law to keep books,7" this exception is somewhat circum-
scribed by custom and law.
Article 109 of the Commercial Code governs proof in commercial
cases by providing that in purchases and sales, parol evidence is
admissible when the court thinks it proper to admit such evidence.1
4
Although the provisions of the article refer specifically only to "pur-
chases and sales" (achats et les ventes), the exemption is recognized
as applying generally to all commercial matters.75 However, a limited
and specified number of commercial transactions do require writing
for their validity, such as agreements creating commercial companies
or partnerships7 and hypothecations of ships." As a practical matter,
it should be noted that any transaction of importance is likely to be
recited in some form of writing."8
In a transaction involving a merchant and a non-merchant, the
(1956) [hereinafter cited as Giverdon]. The principle of the formality of proof is
expressed by the rule that the judge may consider a fact as established only insofar as
its existence has been shown by one of the methods of proof fixed by law.
71. HERZOG at 327-28.
72. FRENCH CIv. CODE art. 1341: "Les tout sans prejudice de ce qui est prescrit
dans les lois relatives au commerce." See also SICARD no. 333.
73. FRENCH C. COM. arts. 8-9.
74. FRENCH C. CoM. art. 109: "Les achats et les ventes se constatent ... Par le
preuve testimoniale, dans le cas od le tribunal croira devoir l'admettre."
75. BODINGTON 83; F. LAWSON, A. ANTON AND L. BROWN, AMoS AND WALTON'S
INTRODUCTION To FRENCH LAW 344 (3d ed. 1967) [hereinafter cited as LAWSON, ANTON
& BROWN]; 2 PLANIOL no. 1140.
76. FRENCH CIV. CODE art. 1834.
77. Id. art. 2120.
78. LAWSON, ANTON & BROWN at 345.
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permissible mode of proof depends upon which party is seeking to
establish the agreement; if the merchant is the plaintiff, he must
prove his case in accordance with the general rules of article 1341, but
if the merchant is the defendant, the non-merchant may take advan-
tage of the less strict commercial rules of proof. 9
Louisiana Law: A Convergence of Theories
Oral Proof and the Theory of Contract Formation
The Louisiana law pertaining to parol evidence is found in arti-
cles 2275-2279 of the Civil Code, which are descended from Roman0
and French law.8 ' In addition, Louisiana has followed the civilian
theory of the consensual nature of contracts82 which declares that
agreements need not be in writing to be binding, but may arise from
the mere exchange of the parties' consent.s3 The theory was implicitly
adopted by the exclusion of a writing requirement from the article
1779 requisites for a valid contract.8"
Adoption of the civilian theory of the consensual nature of con-
tract formation in Louisiana, however, did not prevent the redactors
of the Code from according some weight to the objective manifesta-
tion of the parties' will. In contrast to the French who follow the
subjective will theory85 and thus assert that parties are bound by their
will and that the declaration of the real will, that is, the objective
manifestation is of secondary importance, Louisiana Civil Code arti-
79. BODINGTON at 85.
80. As a commentator of Roman law, Pothier is the polestar of the modern French
jurists. His works exercised the most immediate influence upon the French Civil Code
and it is said that three-fourths of the Code were literally extracted from his treatises.
See W. HUNTER, RoMAN LAW 104 (3d ed. 1897).
81. See MoREAu-LISLET, A DIGEST OF THE CIVIL LAWS NOW IN FORCE IN THE TERRI-
TORY OF ORLEANS 311-12 (1801) [the de la Vergne volume]. Moreau-Lislet's annota-
tions opposite articles 241-49 under the title De la Preuve Testimoniale indicate that
Pothier and Domat were the sources of those articles. In fact, an examination of the
articles reveals that they ware patterned after articles 1341-48 of the French Civil Code.
Moreau-Lislet also cites LAS SIETE PARTIDAS bk. 3, tit. 18, L. 114; 3.16.32; 3.18.117
(Moreau-Lislet & Carelton transl. 1820) and D. Febrero's LIBERIA DE ESCRIBANOS 3.1.7
nos. 330-31, 351 (1790). Those citations pertain to the number of witnesses necessary
to prove an allegation and the probative value to be given their testimony depending
on social status. It would seem that the underpinnings of the Louisiana provisions are
decidedly more French than Spanish.
82. LAWSON, ANTON & BROWN at 151. See LA. CIv. CODE art. 1762 which provides
that the contract between the parties should not be confounded with the writing.
83. LITVINOFF § 135 at 224.
84. 4 AuBRY & RAy at 93.
85. LITVINOFF § 135 at 223.
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cle 1797 provides that since consent is a mere operation of the mind,
it can have no effect unless it is manifested in some manner so that
it can be understood."8 Thus, the Code contemplates use of both the
intention and its expression as a whole to construe agreements.87
When the terms of an agreement are doubtful or uncertain, arti-
cle 1950 of the Civil Code provides a rule of construction for the judge:
When there is anything doubtful in agreements, we must
endeavor to ascertain what was the common intention of the
parties, rather than to adhere to the literal sense of the terms.
The French have also tempered the strictness of their subjective will
theory by the application of article 1156, their counterpart of article
1950. The French courts, however, have subjected the ascertainment
of the real intention of the parties to the ordinary rules of evidence
in article 1341. Thus, by the provisions of article 1341 of the French
Civil Code and its counterpart, article 2276 of the Louisiana .Civil
Code, parol evidence should not be admitted to prove a real intention
different from that expressed in the writing. However, should the
intention of the parties be so doubtful or ambiguous that the rule of
construction is insufficient to ascertain intention, the judge must
depart from the harshness of article 1341 or 2276. 8 The role that parol
evidence and rules of construction" serve in Louisiana and France is
grounded in the development of a bounded theory of proof.'" The
theoretical effect is that a judge can consider a fact as established
only insofar as its existence has been demonstrated by one of the
statutorily prescribed methods of proof,"' a reflection of the basic
tenet in civil law that writing is a more reliable form of proof than
oral evidence.2
Writing Requirements
There are two kinds of writings recognized in the Louisiana Civil
Code under the section "Of Literal Proof." A written instrument may
be drawn up in the presence of a notary and two witnesses (authentic
act)9 3 or signed privately by the parties (act under private signa-
86. Id. at 228.
87. Id. at 227.
88. Id. at 224-25.
89. See also LA. CIv. CODE arts. 1945-62.
90. See text at note 23, supra.
91. Giverdon at 31.
92. Id. at 32.
93. LA. CIv. CODE art. 2234; FRENCH CIV. CODE art. 1317.
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ture).9 ' When an act under private signature is offered as proof
against a party to the act and he acknowledges its execution or is
legally held to have acknowledged it, the private act has the effect of
an authentic act between the parties." In Louisiana, as in France, an
authentic act is full proof of the agreement contained in it."
Writings may serve either an evidentiary or cautionary func-
tion. 7 Louisiana Civil Code articles 2275-2277, like article 1341 of the
French Civil Code, delegate to writings an evidentiary function, since
a writing is not a substantive requirement for the validity of contracts
formed under these articles. While article 2275 provides that every
transfer of immovable property must be in writing, the article also
allows admission of the confession of the vendor or vendee to a verbal
sale or other disposition if actual delivery has been made. Thus, like
the other provisions, this article provides a method of proving a con-
tract rather than a rule establishing a prerequisite for its validity.,'
Perhaps because the frontier conditions in Louisiana in 1825 pre-
cluded an equally wide use of written evidence as was customary in
France at the time, the Civil Code enacted that year did not adopt
the strict French provisions regulating the proof of agreements affect-
ing movables11 As in France, article 2277 of the Civil Code of 1870
requires more proof for contracts involving a value more than five
hundred dollars'" than those involving a lesser value. If an agreement
has not been reduced to writing and its value is less than five hundred
dollars, it may be proved by any competent evidence. If an agreement
not reduced to writing exceeds five hundred dollars, it must be proved
by one credible witness and other corroborating circumstances. Con-
trary to article 1341 of the French Civil Code, however, which requires
a writing for any transaction the object of which exceeds the value of
fifty francs,1'0 Louisiana admits parol evidence to prove all agree-
ments involving movable property which have not been reduced to
writing.'"2
94. LA. CiV. CODE art. 2240; FRENCH CIV. CODE art. 1322.
95. LA. CIv. CODE art. 2242; FRENCH CIv. CODE art. 1322.
96. LA. CIv. CODE art. 2236; FRENCH CIv. CODE art. 1319.
97. See text at notes 54-55, supra.
98. 4 AUBRY & RAu § 306. In the Louisiana Digest of 1808 the provision of article
241, corresponding to LA. CIv. CODE art 2275, was more stringent and thus similar in
nature to the French article. There was an absolute bar to the admission of parol
evidence when the object of the contract was immovable property or a slave.
99. La. Civ. Code art. 2255 (1825).
100. In France, the figure is fifty francs.
101. See 2 COLIN ET CAPIWrANT, Daorr CIVIL FRANqAIS nos. 769, 773 at 513, 514-16
(10e dd. 1948); 2 MAZEAUD, RESPONSABILITIt" CIVILE DELICTUELLE ET CONTRACTUELLE no.
1703 at 508 (4e 6d. 1949).
102. The rule allowing parol is subject to the qualifications that all donations inter
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The Parol Evidence Rule
Article 2276 of the Louisiana Civil Code is the direct descendant
of the maxim lettres passent temoins.13 Its absolute bar against the
admission of parol evidence against or beyond what is contained in a
writing evidencing a transaction is taken verbatim from the French
article 1341. In accordance with the French rule,"4 the provisions of
article 2276 prohibit introduction of parol evidence against any writ-
ten instrument and do not apply only to parol offered against instru-
ments required to be in writing. °5
Both the French and Louisiana Code articles provide further that
parol evidence is not admissible in regard to what is alleged to have
been said before, at the time of, or since the making of the writing.
The prohibition against evidence as to what is alleged to have been
said before or at the time of the making of the writing is redundant
because it excludes parol evidence in the same circumstances as does
the prohibition of evidence against or beyond the writing. However,
the words, "or since the making of the writing" (ou depuis les actes)
introduce an additional restriction applicable to parol evidence of
verbal transactions taking place subsequent to the drawing up of the
writing.10
Louisiana courts, 07 recognizing the unduly harsh effects that a
strict application of the codal provision would require, have often
chosen to depart from civilian doctrine and have preferred to adopt
the common law theory of integration of contracts to achieve more
equitable judgments.' 0 Under the theory of integration, an additional
vivos and mortis causa, except manual donations of corporeal movables, require a
writing. LA. CIv. CODE arts. 1536, 1538, 1570.
103. See LA. CIv. CODE art. 2276: "Neither shall parol evidence be admitted
against or beyond what is contained in the acts, nor on what may have been said
before, or at the time of making them, or since." See generally Comment, 35 LA. L.
REV. 779 (1975).
104. FRENCH CIV. CODE art. 1341 explicitly provides that even when the transac-
tion involves less than fifty francs and a writing is not required, parol evidence is not
admissible against or beyond the contents of an instrument evidencing the transaction.
See note 52, supra.
105. See, e.g., article 2275 requiring dispositions of immovable property to be in
writing. See generally Comment, 35 LA. L. REV. 764 (1975).
106. 12 AUBRY ET RAU at 331; 8 Huc, COMMENTAIRE THAORIQUE ET PRATIQUE DU
CODE CIVIL no 287 at 363 (1895); 5 MARCADIt, EXPLICATION THORIQUE ET PRATIQUE
DU CODE CIVIL n,° 11 at 105 (7e 6d 1873); OEUVREs at 427; 7 PLANIOL ET RIPERT, TRAITt
PRATIQUE DE DROIT CIVIL FRANqAIS no 1527 at 865 (1931).
107. See, e.g., Salley v. Louviere, 183 La. 92, 162 So. 811 (1935).
108. See Comment, 35 LA. L. REV. 779, 792 (1975). See also The Work of the




term or agreement may be proven by parol if the party introducing
the evidence establishes that the parties did not intend the writing
to be the total agreement between them. The theory springs from the
role accorded by the common law to the notary and the weight given
writing as proof. The common law notary has never exercised powers
of a quasi-judicial nature as has the notary at civil law.19 In the past,
common law courts adhered to the concept of the private seal as a
mode of proof and were reluctant to accept the acts of the notary as
evidence. Even when a notarized document was received into evi-
dence, it was not accorded the presumption of authenticity. Contrary
to the French"' and Louisiana"' Civil Codes which provide that an
authentic act is full proof of the agreement contained in it, common
law contends that a writing does not prove its own completeness."'
Further, common law regards all writings as equal, while the civil
law, when referring to a writing as proof, usually intends it to be a
notarial act or an act under private signature which may have the
same probative value as a notarial act."' Since at common law a
writing, standing alone, is not full proof of the agreement, it was
functionally necessary for the common law to be more flexible in
admitting oral contracts which add to the terms of a writing. Thus,
at common law, parol evidence is admissible on the question of
whether a writing was intended by the parties to be the final and
complete integration of their agreement.
The French do not use the criterion of integration to determine
whether parol evidence is admissible, but concentrate on the effect
upon the writing of the parol offered. Pothier"' and Domat 5 indicate
that parol evidence is inadmissible when the oral agreement contra-
dicts a term of the writing, since it is against the act, and when the
oral agreement expands the writing, since it is beyond the act. How-
ever, the occurrence of an act which does not vary a term of the
writing, such as extinction of the obligation by payment, remission
or compensation, constitutes a new and distinct fact which is not
beyond the act and may be established by parol evidence."' While
the effect at common and civil law may be the same, in the civil law,
109 J. PROFFATT, NOTARIES PUBLIC 2 (2d ed. 1892); R. ROTHMAN, CUSTOMS AND
PRACTICES OF NOTARIES PUBLIC 6 (1970).
110. FRENCH CIV. CODE art. 1319.
111. LA. CIv. CODE art. 2236.
112. 3 CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 573 at 360 (1952).
113. See LA. CIv. CODE arts. 2236, 2242.
114. OEuvREs at 428.
115. DOMAT o 2025 at 803.
116. OEvRvES at 428; 2 PLANIOL no. 1139; SICARD no. 329.
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parol evidence is admitted to establish a new fact, and not because
the oral transaction is to be integrated with the written instrument.
Thus, a literal interpretation of article 2276 requires a writing when
the parties desire to negate or enlarge a prior written agreement and
permits parol only to establish a new fact which does not vary a
written term.Such a strict application of article 2276, however, does not recog-
nize the reality of modem business transactions."' Often it is impossi-
ble or impractical to recite in writing every agreement made subse-
quent to the original writing which established the contract between
the parties. Moreover, the French courts do not apply the counterpart
of article 2276 in commercial transactions," 8 article 109 of the French
Code of Commerce granting the judge discretion to admit parol evi-
dence to prove the existence of a subsequent oral agreement and even
to vary or controvert the contents of a written instrument in the
commercial sphere."' Since it would seem unrealistic to apply article
2276 in matters that its French counterpart, article 1341, did not
contemplate, legislative consideration should be given to adjusting
Louisiana's approach to the admission of parol evidence, at least in
commercial transactions. Admission of parol evidence proving subse-
quent oral agreements that do not vary the written terms of the
agreement should also be legislatively sanctioned in Louisiana. How-
ever, if the parties vary written agreements orally, they should be
bound by a strict civilian application of article 2276, lest writings be
relegated to simply another form of testimony to be weighed in the
determination of the parties' intent.
The major exception to the French parol evidence rule, the
commencement of written proof,'" was recognized by the Louisiana
Digest of 1808 to prove agreements relating to movables, 121 but the
article was suppressed and was not carried into the Civil Codes of
1825 and 1870. However, a remnant of the exception is found in the
last sentence of article 2238 relating to recitals in an act unrelated to
the principal matter, to wit: "Enunciations foreign to the disposition
can only serve as a commencement of proof." It is unclear whether
the redactors of the Civil Code intended article 2238 to be the only
117. See UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-202(b) which admits parol evidence of
"consistent additional terms unless the court finds the writing to have been intended
also as a complete and exclusive statement of the terms of the agreement."
118. FRENCH CIV. CODE art. 1341.
119. FRENCH C. COM. art. 109: "Les achats et les ventes se constatent ... Par Ia
preuve testimoniale, dans le cas ou le tribunal croira devoir l'admettre."
120. See text at notes 60-63, supra.
121. La. Digest of 1808, ch. I, sec. mH, art. 244.
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application of the doctrine of commencement of written proof; how-
ever, since the Civil Code does not generally require the transfer of
movables to be in writing and because the public records doctrine
governs the transfer of immovable property, the practical significance
of the doctrine is greatly diminished.
Much confusion about the admissibility of parol evidence has
been caused by article 1900. Article 1900 provides that if the cause
expressed in the contract is nonexistent, the contract may not be
invalidated if the existence of a true and sufficient cause can be
shown. Some Lousiana jurists have contended that the purpose of
this article was to provide an exception to the general prohibition of
parol evidence to show a different cause than that expressed in the
act.' 2 Although article 1900 has no direct counterpart in the French
Civil Code, it does have its origins in French jurisprudence and has
been the subject of examination by the commentators.' 3 The rule of
article 1900, as interpreted by the French, is that parol evidence is
admissible to show the true cause of the contract in order to sustain
it, only after the falsity of the cause recited has been proved by
evidence ordinarily admissible against written instruments.'2 ' Thus,
in the absence of fraud or mutual error, the person attacking the
contract should be required to show the absence of cause in the act
by evidence other than parol.
Articles 2276 and 2236, read together, establish that parol evi-
dence is admissible to establish fraud, duress or mutual error. Since
the subjective will of the parties is not expressed in a writing executed
under conditions of fraud, duress or mutual error, and, in fact, con-
sent is vitiated,'25 parol evidence is admissible, not to prove the con-
tents of the writing, but to determine the reality of the contract.
Thus, Civil Code articles 1848 and 2288 expressly authorize all means
of proof to establish fraud.' While Louisiana did not enact the
French exception admitting parol when it is impossible to produce a
writing on account of mutual error and duress,' the jurisprudence
admits parol in these instances on the basis that the writing was not
122. See Robinson v. Britton, 137 La. 863, 868, 69 So. 282, 284 (1915); Clark v.
Hedden, 109 La. 147, 154, 33 So. 116, 119 (1902).
123. 3 TOULUER, LE DROIT CIVIL FRANqAiS nos. 175-77 at 381-82 (derniere 6d. 1833)
[hereinafter cited as 3 ToULLR].
124. 12 BAUDRY-LACANTINERIE ET BARDE, TRArrt TH9ORIQUE ET PRATIQUE DE DROIT
CIVIL, 1 DES OBLIGATIONS no 308 at 341 (3e 6d. 1906) [hereinafter cited as DES OBLI-
GATIONS]; 3 TOULLIER at 382. See generally Comment, 3 LA. L. REV. 427 (1941).
125. LA. CIv. CODE arts. 1779, 1819.
126. FRENCH CIV. CODE art. 1348,
127. See text at note 68, supra.
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effective between the parties.12
Article 2279 of the Louisiana Civil Code did carry over the
French exception of impossibility of producing literal proof when the
writing has been lost or destroyed by accident or force. '2 Parol evi-
dence may be offered to establish the contents of the lost act, but the
testimony or corroborating circumstances must render the loss proba-
ble.
A final situation in which parol evidence is admissible is pro-
vided by article 2239, allowing forced heirs to annul a simulation of
those from whom they inherit. As between the parties to a simulation,
French authorities assert that the fact of simulation may only be
established by a counter-letter,3 ' which can have no effect against
creditors or bona fide purchasers. Thus, while a creditor of an appar-
ent vendor may introduce parol evidence and the counter-letter to
establish that the transaction was a simulation to defraud him of
attachable assets, the creditor of the apparent vendee will prime him
since the counter-letter cannot prejudice his rights. 3' Civilian doc-
trine in this instance restricts the subjective will theory to protect the
interests of third parties by permitting them to rely on the apparent
declared intent of the contracting parties.3 '
Conclusion
Louisiana's law of proof derives from a civilian tradition which
recognizes the superiority of written proof. Rigid application of article
2276 which precludes parol evidence against or beyond a written act
may produce harsh effects and the courts will be tempted to stray
from civilian doctrine and incorporate common law notions. In
France, the judge serves in a distinctly inferior position vis-A-vis the
dictates of the Code Civil and must operate within the framework of
a bounded theory of proof; in Louisiana, as a practical matter, the
role of the judge is not nearly as limited.'33 Louisiana, as a mixed
jurisdiction, should recognize statutorily the impracticality of model-
ing its judicial roles from those of the French and legislatively grant
128. See, e.g., Reynaud v. Bullock, 195 La. 86, 196 So. 29 (1940).
129. FRENCH CIV. CODE art. 1348(4). See text at note 67, supra.
130. 12 AUBRY ET RAU at 184; 2 BAUDRY-LACANTINERIE, PR CIS DE DROIT CIVIL nos.
295-96 at 299 (12e 6d. 1902); 4 DEMOLOMBE, TRArrg DES CONTMATS nos. 303-49 at 270-98
(1878); 4 DES OBLIGATIONS at 111-38.
131. 2 PLANIOL no. 1199.
132. LITINOFF § 135 at 226.
133. A. Tate, The Role of the Judge in Mixed Jurisdictions: The Louisiana
Experience in THE ROLE OF JUDICIAL DECISIONS AND DOCTRINE IN CIVIL LAW AND MIXED
JURISDICTONS 23 (Dainow ed. 1974).
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its judges broader discretion to evaluate the probative weight to be
given parol evidence in certain defined instances. At a minimum,
Louisiana should recognize the French exception allowing admission
of parol evidence in commercial matters as the judge sees fit, in order
to reflect changing commercial practices yet remain consistent with
civilian theory.
R. Patrick Vance
